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TfHE ARTIST who paints a landscape has at his disposal all the
colors of the spectrum, but the lawyer who drafts a dispositive
instrument has available only a limited number of fixed types
of present and future estates and other interests in property,
legal or equitable. These are the chips with which the game of con-
veyancing is played, and, as to function, they may be roughly di-
vided into family interests and commercial interests. They include
the fee simple, the term of years, the reversion, the life estate, and
the remainder. The first three are largely commercial, while the
life estate and remainder are entirely noncommercial and of great
utility in family settlements of property, especially those which seek
to provide for more than one generation. The most sophisticated
branch of the common law, the law of property with its concepts of
temporally divided ownership, the trust, and the power of appoint-
ment, affords great flexibility of disposition, although in a number of
situations at the price of considerable constructional uncertainty
and legal technicality.1 This article will discuss certain nontax
aspects of the third member of this legal trinity, the power of
appointment, concerning what it is, why to use it, and how to use it,
primarily from the standpoint of the estate planner and draftsman.
It has been said that "the power of appointment is the most effi-
cient dispositive device that the ingenuity of Anglo-American law.
yers has ever worked out."2 However, like most interesting things, it
has a past, and this past is such that the present-day lawyer cannot
be unmindful of it. Except by special custom in certain localities,
*This article in substance reproduces a paper by the author presented to the
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it was impossible under English law to devise a legal freehold until
the Statute of Wills (1540).3 It was possible, however, for a land-
owner to circumvent this disability by resort to a use coupled with
a power of appointment. For example, A, the fee simple owner,
by an inter vivos conveyance could transfer his land to B in fee simple
to the use of such persons as he, A, should by will appoint, and in
default of and until such appointment, to the use of A and his
heirs. Prior to the Statute of Uses (1536),4 B held legal title for A's
use and benefit. When A died leaving a will appointing the proper-
ty, legal title was still in B, but as feoffee to uses, B was under a duty
to convey to the persons named in A's will which the court of chan-
cery would enforce. In'theory, A's appointees took by way of shift-
ing use on an event named in A's original conveyance to B, namely
the exercise by A of his testamentary power of appointment. Thus,
the title passed not by A's will but by A's inter vivos conveyance.
This probable original function of the power of appointment
and the legal theory then necessary for its operation are of funda-
mental importance to us today, for these two factors established the
orthodox common law theory that the exercise of the power is the
event upon which the title shifts, not the conveyance, and title thus
passes from the donor to the appointee. If T devises property to A
for life, remainder to such persons as A shall appoint, and A appoints
to B, B takes title from T, not from A. The appointment is said
to relate back to the creation of the power and to operate as if A
had filled in a blank in T's will.5 Current American law regarding
powers of appointment is the outgrowth of a fundamental acceptance
of the relation back doctrine, 6 subject to important exceptions where
the proprietary aspect of the power of appointment is most appar-
ent, such as the general power presently exercisable, which is in
essence ownership.7
832 Hen. 8, c. 1.
'27 Hen. 8, c. 10.
IDant v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 302 Ky. 54, 193 S.W.2d 399 (1946); Hogarth-
Swann v. Weed, 274 Mass. 125, 174 N.E. 314 (1931); Matter of Harbeck, 161 N.Y. 211,
55 N.E. 850 (1900); Chewning v. Eason, 158 N.C. 578, 74 S.E. 357 (1912); Common-
wealth v. Williams' Ex'rs, 13 Pa. 29 (1850); Commonwealth v. Duffield, 12 Pa. 277
(1849).
0 Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Wolff, 35 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup. Ct. 1942); City
Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Green, 160 Misc. 370, 289 N.Y. Supp. 473 (Sup. Ct. 1936);
3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, 387 (1952) [hereinafter cited as POWELL]; Simes, The
Devolution of Title to Appointed Property, 22 ILL. L. REv. 480 (1928).
7Jones v. Clifton, 101 U.S. 225 (1879); Matter of Hicks, 173 Misc. 91, 18 N.Y.S.2d
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The power of appointment thus carries the dust of five centuries
or more of Anglo-American law. Although the English Statute of
Wills largely obviated the earlier testamentary function of the power
of appointment, its flexibility and maneuverability made it a con-
veyancer's favorite, especially with the advent of strict family settle-
ments. Thus, it was used to circumvent certain disabilities of
married women relating to the ownership and conveyance of their
property," to escape dower and curtesy,9 and to avoid or lessen cer-
tain burdens of feudal tenure, including relief and primer seisin,
the death taxes of the feudal era.
In the United States prior to 1900, there was hardly a law of
powers of appointment. With considerable reliance upon English
common law, the Restatement of Property, adopted in 1938, gave the
bar its first complete and systematic American presentation of the
subject. Today there are great gaps yet to be filled in the law of
most states before anything like a complete American law of powers
can exist. In North Carolina, for example, lawyers of the landed
gentry of pre-Civil War days seem to have made considerable use of
powers of appointment, but after 1865 the practice declined, and
litigation concerning common law powers of appointment is still not
great. In order to develop such a body of law there must be accumu-
lated wealth to be disposed of, conveyancing lawyers alert to the
potentialities of the power, and significant relative advantages in
comparison with other available dispositive devices. In estate plan-
ning and drafting, it is, in combination with successive estates, the
tool par excellence for the avoidance or minimization of estate
taxes, 10 and by no other legal concept can such flexibility be im-
parted to property settlements." There is considerable case law and
some statutes upon which the North Carolina lawyer can rely, and
182 (Sur. Ct. 1939); Rogers v. Hinton, 62 N.C. 101 (1867). See McDougal, Future
Interests Restated: Tradition versus Clarification and Reform, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1077,
1104-15 (1942), for a critique of the Restatement of Property's general acceptance of
the dogma of relation back.
"Young v. Sheldon, 139 Ala. 444, 36 So. 27 (1904); Norfleet v. Hawkins, 93 N.C.
392 (1885).
0 Matter of Davies, 124 Misc. 541, 209 N.Y. Supp. 296 (Surr. Ct.), afJ'd, 215 App. Div.
750, 212 N.Y. Supp. 796 (1925), aff'd, 242 N.Y. 196, 151 N.E. 205 (1926); Barr v. Howell,
85 Misc. 350, 147 N.Y. Supp. 483 (Sup. Ct. 1914); Ray v. Pung, 5 B. & Aid. 561, 106 Eng.
Rep. 1296 (K.B. 1822).
10see LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES § 41.3 (2d ed. 1962);
Lowndes, Estate Planning and Powers of Appointment, 30 N.C.L. REV. 225 (1952).
1 1 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, introductory note to §§ 318-69 (1940), discusses the
functions of powers of appointment.
[Vol. 1964: 32
THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT
the texts and leading cases from other jurisdictions afford sufficient
guidance for the intelligent use of the power of appointment along
common law lines. Where uncertainties still remain, expert drafting
can eliminate most of them.
12
THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT CONCEPT AND ITS TERMINOLOGY
The Restatement of Property defines the power of appointment
as "a power created or reserved by a person (the donor) having
property subject to his disposition enabling the donee of the power,
within such limits as the donor may prescribe, to designate the trans-
ferees of the property or the shares in which the property shall be
received."' 3 Essentially it is a discretionary power with relation to
specific property, apart from any ownership thereof, to specify the
appointees or their shares of ownership in the property. This defini-
tion expressly excludes powers of sale, powers of attorney, a power to
revoke a trust, and a trustee's discretionary power to augment income
out of principal or to sprinkle income or principal among a group of
beneficiaries. However, it must be remembered that these are prop-
erty concepts, some of which are treated as powers of appointment
for tax and other purposes. In reality, one might say there are four
general classifications of powers: (1) common law,' 4 (2) Restatement
of Property,'5 (3) state statutory,'6 and (4) federal estate tax..7  In
estate planning and drafting, a lack of awareness of what fact situa-
tions may be legally classified as powers of appointment and how
they operate can result in unintended creation or exercise with ad-
verse results. For example, a trustee's discretionary power to sprin-
kle income or principal among trust beneficiaries is treated as a
power of appointment,"8 and a conveyance of land to A for life,
remainder as he shall appoint, with a gift to A's heirs in default of
12 See generally Casner, Estate Planning-Powers of Appointment, 64 HARv. L. REV.
185 (1950); Fleming, Provisions for Trusts and Powers of Appointment, 1950 U. ILL.
L.F. 341; Halbach, The Use of Powers of Appointment in Estate Planning, 45 IowA
L. REv. 691 (1960); Leach, supra note 2; Stephenson, Powers of Appointment, 29 TRUST
BULL. 21 (1950).
18 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 318 (1940).
14 SimEs & SMrTH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 872 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as SimEs &
SMrTH].
1
5 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 318-69 (1940).
16 The outstanding example is N.Y. REAL PROP. LAv § 5.
17 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041.
18 See notes 166, 167 infra.
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appointment might attract the Rule in Shelley's Case if A appoints
the remainder to his heirs or does not exercise the power.10
As a matter of terminology, the law of powers has its accepted
definitions. The creator of the power is the donor; the recipient of
the power is the donee. The persons to whom or for whom the
appointment may be made are the objects of the power, and persons
outside this class are known as strangers to the power. The person
to or for whom an appointment is made is the appointee, and the
person who is to receive the property in default of effective appoint-
ment is the taker in default. The property subject to appointment
is the appointive property, and the making of an appointment by the
donee is called its exercise.20
II
ABSOLUTE INTEREST IN DONEE VERSUS
LIMITED ESTATE AND POWER OF APPOINTMENT
The beneficial absolute owner of property has as an incident
thereof certain wide powers of disposition. The magic of the power
of appointment enables such an owner to confer these powers of
disposition in the form of a power of appointment upon either a
nonowner or a limited owner of this property and thereby make him,
in practical effect, the absolute owner. Thus, if the owner conveys
property to A for life and at A's death to such person or persons as A
shall appoint by will, although A's ownership terminates at his death,
his power of appointment enables him to dispose of the property by
will as he sees fit. If, on the other hand, the fee simple owner trans-
fers his estate to A, rules regarding restraints on alienation prevent
him from withholding from A such incidents as the freedom to
transfer by deed or will or to have the property pass by intestate
succession.2' As stated above, such limitations may in effect be
accomplished, however, by conveying to A a limited estate with a
power of appointment in fee, by virtue of which A may be given
the principal powers and prerogatives of fee simple ownership with-
out all the incidents thereof. Except as provided by some statutes,
"- Heid v. Fortunato, 15 Del. Ch. 367, 138 At. 606 (Ch. 1927); Cushing v. Blake, 80
NJ. Eq. 689 (Ct. Err. & App. 1879); RESTATEMENT, PRoPRTY § 312, comment i (1940).
But cf. Patrick v. Morehead, 85 N.C. 62 (1881).
20 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 319 (1940).
21 Payne v. Hart, 178 Ark. 100, 9 S.W.2d 1059 (1928); Gray v. Gray, 800 Ky. 265, 188
S.W.2d 440 (1945); Andrews v. Hall, 156 Neb. 817, 58 N.W.2d 201 (1953); Soper v
Melford, 258 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); RFsTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 406 (1944)
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this will not enlarge such estate into a fee or expose the limited
owner to all of its burdensome incidents. 22 However, because of the
general prevalence of fee simple presumption statutes, great care
must be taken to create an express life estate coupled with such a
power and a valid remainder in default of appointment.23 If there
is a general devise with an attempted gift over of what remains
undisposed of by the first taker, such a gift over is generally held
invalid because it prevents devolution of the fee simple by intes-
tacy.24 However, some cases and statutes cause such a limitation to
create a life estate with a power to appoint the remainder in fee.23
III
KINDS OF POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
Common law powers of appointment are classified in a number
of ways, but only two of these classifications are generally involved
in the drafting of wills and trusts. These are the manner in which
a power can be exercised and the scope of the power granted. As
to manner of exercise, this may be done by deed, by will, or by
either deed or will. The Restatement defines the power to appoint
by will only as a testamentary power, while the other two are
classified as powers presently exercisable.26  As to scope, the Re-
statement classifies powers as general and special. A power is
general if it can be exercised wholly in favor of the donee or his
estate. It is special if it can be exercised only in favor of persons
other than the donee and if the donor has not manifested an intent
to create or reserve the power primarily for the donee's benefit.27
However, these four groupings according to manner of exercise and
scope will not accomodate all powers of appointment. For example,
'2 Rudisell v. Hoyle, 254 N.C. 33, 118 S.E.2d 145 (1961); Hardee v. Rivers, 228 N.C.
66, 44 S.E.2d 476 (1947); Chewning v. Eason, 158 N.C. 578, 74 S.E. 357 (1912); Long v.
Waldraven, 113 N.C. 337, 18 S.E. 251 (1893); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 111 (1936,
Supp. 1948).
232 POWELL 184 n.64 (1950); RESrATEMENT, PROPERTY § 39 (1936, Supp. 1948).
See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-1 (1950); Alexander v. Cunningham, 27 N.C. 430 (1845)
(antedates the statute).
24 Tarbell v. Smith, 125 Iowa 388, 101 N.W. 118 (1904); Basnight v. Dill, 256 N.C.
474, 124 S.E.2d 159 (1962); Burgess v. Simpson, 224 N.C. 102, 29 S.E.2d 38 (1944);
Heefner v. Thornton, 216 N.C. 702, 6 S.E.2d 506 (1939); Moore v. Holbrook, 175 Va.
471, 9 S.E.2d 447 (1940). But see Hoskins v. May, 213 N.C. 795, 197 S.E. 689 (1938).
25 Merrill v. Pardun, 125 Neb. 701, 251 N.W. 834 (1933); Chesnut v. Chesnut, 300
Pa. 146, 151 AtI. 339 (1930); N.Y. REAL PROP. Lw § 57.
20RETATEMENT, PROPERTY § 321 (1940)
27 1d. § 320.
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a power to appoint to anyone except the donee or his estate is neither
general nor special, and the power in a donee aged twenty-five to
appoint by deed when he attains age thirty is neither presently
exercisable nor testamentary. Such powers are fairly numerous and
are classified as hybrid powers.28
Another common law classification of powers of appointment,
which the Restatement expressly refuses to recognize, 29 is based upon
the proprietary interest of the donee in the appointive property.
Under this classification powers are either appendant or appurtenant,
in gross, or simply collateral. If the donee has an interest in the
property which is affected by his exercise of the power, an appendant
or appurtenant power is involved, e.g., to A for life, with power to
appoint in fee by deed, and A conveys the possessory estate in fee
simple to B.30 If the donee's interest is not so affected by an exer-
cise, the power is in gross, e.g., to A for life, remainder as he shall
appoint by will;31 and if the donee owns no interest in the property,
the power is simply collateral, e.g., to A for life, remainder as B shall
appoint. 2 While powers appendant to a limited estate are valid
and useful today, a power of appointment appendant to a fee simple
seems anomalous and of questionable utility; and though it was valid
by English common law, modem American cases generally hold that
when such a power is attached to a fee simple estate, it is either void
or merges with the donee's estate.3 3  The Restatement takes the
position that every power of appointment is void to the extent that
its exercise divests a beneficial interest owned by the donee, e.g.,
property is conveyed to A for life, remainder as A shall appoint.
The rationale is that the power exists exclusively over the remainder
and not over the life estate. This is contrary to the old common
law theory but strictly true analytically because the life tenant has
two interests, a life estate and a power of appointment. 4 Powell
states that the power appendant as to a fee still exists in some juris-
28 United States Trust Co. v. Montclair Trust Co., 133 N.J. Eq. 579, 33 A.2d 901
(Ch. 1943); REsTATEE NT, PROPERTY § 321, comment d (1940). See Gold, The Classifica-
tion of Some Powers of Appointment, 40 MicH. L. REv. 337 (1942).
20 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 318, comment c (1940); id. § 325, comment a.
30 Troy v. Troy, 60 N.C. 624 (1864).
3LSee Norfleet v. Hawkins, 93 N.C. 392 (1885).
82 Smith v. Garey, 22 N.C. 42 (1838).
33 Tillett v. Nixon, 180 N.C. 195, 104 S.E. 352 (1920); Browning V. Bluegrass Hard-
ware Co., 153 Va. 20, 149 S.E. 497 (1929).
"t REsTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 325 (1940).
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dictions and may be used when necessary to evade present-day archaic
restraints on married women as to contracts and conveyances of their
separate property.85
IV
SOME REASONS FOR THE USE OF POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
When it is desired to arrange for one's property to be enjoyed by
more than one generation, the power of appointment seems to be the
most efficient method by which one may so control the devolution
of his property as to avoid the normal risks of improvident loss by his
beneficiaries and at the same time preserve flexibility of disposition
and achieve increased technical freedom in long-term property settle-
ments.8 6 The estate planner and draftsman, however, must carefully
weigh the pros and cons in each case as to both the question of
whether a power should be created or whether an existent power
should be exercised in the light of the persons and property involved
and certain rules of substantive law which bulk large concerning
both the creation and exercise of powers. Some of the reasons why a
power of appointment may be effectively used include:
(1) Uncertainty of the future. The power of appointment
imparts a needed element of elasticity in the settlement of the aver-
age estate. For example, assume that T has a wife and three chil-
dren, A, B, and C. If T consulted an attorney about planning his
estate and drafting the necessary dispositive instruments, including
a will, T would probably express only the general desire that his
wife have his property for her life and that his children receive it
in equal shares at her death. The attorney's legal experience and
knowledge of such matters would immediately suggest some of the
probable future contingencies. For example, T's wife may prede-
cease him; more children may be born; some may predecease T, and
others may predecease his wife if she outlives him; one or more of
such children may leave issue or a widow or both; child A may make
a million, B may marry a million, and C may become mentally or
11r See 3 POWELL 388 (1952), where the author concludes that the Restatement's
"recognition of the death of powers appendant was a trifle premature." See also
Norflect v. Hawkins, 93 N.C. 392 (1885); Levy v. Griffis, 65 N.C. 236 (1871).
8' STEPHENSoN, DRAFTING WILLS AND TRUST AGREEmENTs: DissPosiTVE PROVISIONS §§
4.3, 4.4 (1955) [hereinafter cited as STEPHENSON] presents some fifteen nontax reasons
for utilizing powers of appointment in estate planning.
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physically a cripple. Under these circumstances, equality of shares
would be a poor distribution. Moreover, family changes are not
the only factors which T must consider. Other uncertainties, in-
cluding ever changing social, political, legal, and economic condi-
tions, must be borne in mind. By using a power of appointment of
sufficient flexibility and duration so that ultimate disposition is left
to the discretion of the donee, T may avoid a too rigid plan of
disposition, lessen the necessity for including alternative benefi-
ciaries and complicated contingency provisions in his will, and post-
pone final settlement of his estate until many years after his death.
In his will Lord Mansfield put the matter succinctly:
Those who are nearest and dearest to me best know how to manage and
improve, and ultimately in their turn to divide and subdivide, the good
things of this world which I commit to their care, according to events
and contingencies which it is impossible for me to foresee, or trace
through all the mazy labyrinths of time and chance.37
(2) The human element: mother and children. The will of
Robert Young, who was killed in the Civil War, seems to provide a
good example of planning which recognized this factor. It said: "To
my beloved wife I give all my estate, real, personal and mixed, to be
managed by her (and that she may be enabled the better to control
and manage our children), to be disposed by her to them in that
manner she may think best for their good and her own happiness."88
It was held that the widow was trustee of this estate for herself and
her children, with power to appoint the principal to them as she
saw fit. To the contention of the children that they were absolutely
entitled to the property at age twenty-one, the court declared:
And by the good of the children, he did not mean their pecuniary ad-
vancement only or mainly; but their moral, mental and religious training
and their filial duty and subjection .... It is true, the mother's control
over, and duties to the child, do in one sense partly cease at the child's
majority; but it is equally true, that just then the child's filial duties to
the mother begin afresh, and ever grow and grow, as he goes forward to
manhood and she backward to childhood.39
Thus, it would seem that a power of disappointment in the widow
might greatly aid in the rearing of the children and the happiness of
37 3 CAmPBELL, LrVES OF THE CHIEF JuSTICES OF ENGLAND 470 (Am. ed. 1874).38 Young v. Young, 68 N.C. 309, 310 (1873).
39 Id. at 314.
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the mother, since an unruly child or a forgetful adult could not
with proprietary impunity be unmindful of his mother. However,
this case also points out the possibility that as she grows older, the
mother will have decreasing capacity of decision, and she may fall
under the domination of one of her children who might not be the
most deserving member of the family.
(3) Avoidance of probate. 'Another important reason for creat-
ing a life estate and remainder in property is the avoidance of ex-
penses and the delay and uncertainties incident to the probate of a
will at the life tenant's death. This may be assured by a fixed life
estate and remainder or an estate by which the life tenant has a
power to appoint by deed only, with a remainder over to the extent
that the power is not effectively exercised. However, if the life
tenant is given a general power of appointment which is either
presently exercisable or testamentary and it is exercised by his will,
the property may not go directly from the donor to the donee's
appointees or the takers in default. It may have to pass through the
hands of the donee's executor in order, for example, to effect the
transfer or to pay the donee's debts;40 and if a trust is involved, the
property may be subjected to both extra executor's and trustee's
fees under this arrangement.41 If the orthodox common law theory
of powers were applied and the donee's appointment were read back
into the donor's deed or will creating the power, there would be but
one fee payable under these circumstances. 42 If the power is general
and the trust ends at the life tenant's death, it creates problems as to
both the trustee's duties regarding the property and its inclusion in
the donee's estate. 43 The draftsman creating or exercising a power
of appointment must obviously be alert to these problems and
should explicitly cover the question whether or not the property is
to pass through the estate of the donee.
(4) Avoidance of claims of the donee's creditors. As previously
stated, it is the basic theory of powers of appointment that a power
is not property and the appointee acquires ownership from the donor
,
0 Aultman v. Myers, 239 Iowa 940, 33 N.W.2d 400 (1948); Boston Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. Alfred Univ., 339 Mass. 82, 157 N.E.2d 662 (1959); Olney v. Balch, 154
Mass. 318, 28 N.E. 258 (1891).
," Matter of Culver, 294 N.Y. 321, 62 N.E.2d 213 (1945).
42 Note, 21 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 147 (1946).
48 1 NOSSAMAN, TRusT ADMINISTRATION AND TAXATION § 36.28 (2d ed. 1961); Schuyler,
Some Problems with Powers, 45 ILL. L. REv. 57, 66-71 (1950).
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rather than from the donee.4 Since property ownership is essen-
tially an aggregate of controls, however, in some situations the
donee's extensive control over the property subject to his power
has caused him rather than the donor to be treated as its real owner.4 5
In the case of a general power, if the donee exercises this power and
his own assets are insufficient to pay his debts, his creditors may
reach the appointive property under the equitable assets doctrine
in preference to any appointee other than a purchaser for value.40
Since a power of appointment is not property but a mere discre-
tionary power, it is the common law rule that the subject property
may not be reached by creditors of the donee so long as the power
remains unexercised and the donor and donee are not the same
person.47 It has been said that "the power of a person to appoint
an estate to himself is no more property than his power to write a
book or sing a song."' 48 However, since a general power is in reality
a blank check or deed of the property executed by the donor and
only awaits the donee's filling in the payee or grantee's name, there
is some justification for treating it as the donee's property from the
standpoint of his creditors. The Bankruptcy Act provides that an
unexercised power which is exercisable for the donee's own benefit
passes to his trustee in bankruptcy,49 but this provision has been held
not to include a general testamentary power.Y0 Some states have by
statute changed the common law rule as to creditors of a donee life
tenant by making him owner in fee of the property subject to the
power.51 The special power differs fundamentally from the general
power and is considered a fiduciary relation rather than property.
Thus, in case of a special power not itself involving a fraudulent
conveyance from the donor, the donee's creditors cannot reach the
" See note 5 supra.
4r See note 7 supra.
4" RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 329, 330 (1940); see 3 POWELL 389 n.95 (1952) for an
excellent collection of cases. See also Leigh v. Smith, 38 N.C. 442 (1844); Smith v.
Garey, 22 N.C. 40 (1838).
,7 Gilman v. Bell, 99 Ill. 144 (1881); Quinn v. Tuttle, 104 N.H. 1, 177 A.2d 391
(1962); Leggett v. Doremus, 25 N.J. Eq. 122 (Ch. 1874); Arnold v. Southern Pine
Lumber Co., 58 Tex. Civ. App. 186, 123 S.W. 1162 (1909).
4"In re Armstrong, 17 Q.B.D. 521, 531 (1886).
49Bankruptcy Act § 70a, ch. 541, 80 Stat. 565 (1898) (amended by 66 Stat. 429
(1952), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § ll0a (1958)).
1o Forbes v. Snow, 245 Mass. 85, 140 N.E. 418 (1923); Montague v. Silsbee, 218 Mass.
107, 105 N.E. 611 (1914); In re Peck's Estate, 320 Mich. 692, 82 N.W.2d 14 (1948). See
also note 91 infra.
51 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 111 (1936); id. § 827 (1940).
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property and thereby benefit a person to whom he could not ap-
point.52
A counsel of caution seems in order here as to creation and
exercise of powers. If the donee of a general power has insufficient
assets of his own to pay his debts, such a power should never be
exercised in favor of a volunteer. If the donor has real concern
about the possible debts or other liabilities of his beneficiary, any
estate plans might be wrecked if a general power is given to such-a
beneficiary because it cannot be insulated against the donee's cred-
itors by provisions of the creating instrument.55 In states having
severe limitations on spendthrift trusts, a discretionary trust may be
the best solution.54
(5) Avoidance of marital property rights of the donee's spouse.
If a donor wants to prevent the spouse of a donee-beneficiary from
acquiring some of the subject property contrary to the beneficiary's
wishes, he can confer what practically amounts to fee ownership
through the use of a life estate and general power of appointment.
Relying upon the basic theories that a donee has a mere power and
not ownership of the property subject to the power and that upon
an appointment title passes from the donor to the appointee,5 5 it is
held that such rights as dower, curtesy, inchoate rights in the nature
of such interests, or a statutory forced share do not attach to the
appointive property, whether the power be general or special,
exercised or unexercised.5 6 However, if the donee specifically ap-
points the property to his own estate, a compulsory forced share
statute in favor of the widow who elects against his will might sub-
ject the property to her claim.57  By statute in many states a subse-
quent marriage revokes a prior will either entirely or as to the
spouse, with certain exceptions including a will exercising a power of
52 Mercantile Trust Co. v. Bergdorf & Goodman Co., 167 Md. 158, 173 Ad. 31 (1934);
Price v. Cherbounier, 103 Md. 107, 63 AtI. 209 (1906); Fiduciary Trust Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 181 N.E.2d 6 (Mass. 1962); Prescott v. Wordell, 319 Mass. 118, 65 N.E.2d 19
(1946); Holt v. Hogan, 58 N.C. 82 (1859). But see United States Trust Co. v. Montclair
Trust Co., 133 N.J. Eq. 579, 33 A.2d 901 (Ch. 1943).
11 State St. Trust Co. v. Kissel, 302 Mass. 328, 19 N.E.2d 25 (1939); RESTATEtENT,
PROPERTY § 329 (1940).
" See 2 ScowT, TRUSTS § 155 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as ScoTT].
" See note 5 supra.
50 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Miller, 278 N.Y. 134, 15 N.E.2d 553 (1938); City
Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Green, 160 Misc. 370, 289 N.Y. Supp. 473 (Sup. Ct. 1936);
In re Kate's Estate, 282 Pa. 417, 128 Ad. 97 (1925); REsTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 332
(1940).
67 Simnrs & SMITh § 947; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 341 (1940).
Vol. 1964:3$2]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
appointment unless the appointive property would pass in default of
appointment to the testator's heirs. 8
V
THE CREATION AND EXERCISE OF POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
A. Creation of Powers
No particular word formula is required to create a power of
appointment. If the instrument which is alleged to create a power
of appointment meets the formal requirements for the validity of a
deed or will, it may create a power if the donor so intends.50 Such a
formally sufficient deed or will means an instrument legally valid to
create the interest which will arise by the exercise of the power.
Thus, an otherwise valid oral lease could not create a power in the
lessee to convey a fee simple in the subject land because of the uni-
form requirement of a signed written instrument to transfer an
interest in land.60
Since no particular language is necessary to create a power, any
words sufficiently definite to disclose its nature, the donee, and its
objects are sufficient. 61 A power may also arise by implication. 2
Assuming that a power has been created, its nature and extent are
a matter of construction of the language used in the light of the
surrounding circumstances.63 For example, it has been held that a
power to sell does not include a power to mortgage,6 but a general
power of appointment presently exercisable includes the power to
mortgage.6 5
u8 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-53 (Supp. 1961); 6 POWELL 975 (1958).
50In re Lidston's Estate, 32 Wash. 2d 408, 202 P.2d 259 (1949); RFSTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 323 (1940).
G0Devereux v. McMahon, 108 N.C. 134, 12 S.E. 902 (1891); 6 POWELL 881, 894(1958).01Winchell v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 710 (S.D. Cal.), af'd, 289 F.2d 212 (9th
Cir. 1960); Frank v. Frank, 305 Ill. 181, 137 N.E. 151 (1922); Kirkland v. Mercantile-
Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 218 Md. 17, 145 A.2d 230 (1958); Powell v. Wood, 149
N.C. 235, 62 S.E. 1071 (1908).02Loud v. Poland, 126 Me. 45, 136 At. 119 (1927); Bundy v. United States Trust
Co., 257 Mass. 72, 153 N.E. 337 (1926); In re Clark, 274 App. Div. 49, 80 N.Y.S.2d 1(1948); Albert v. Isbrandtsen Co., 7 Misc. 2d 67, 160 N.Y.S.2d 772 (Sup. Ct. 1957);
Herring v. Williams, 158 N.C. 1, 73 S.E. 218 (1911); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 323,
comment f (1940).
e"Tillett v. Nixon, 180 N.C. 195, 104 S.E. 352 (1920); Parks v. Robinson, 138 N.C.
269, 50 S.E. 649 (1905); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 241, 323 (1940).
"eHeiseman v. Lowenstein, 113 Ark. 404, 169 S.V. 224 (1914); Brunton v. East-
hampton Say. Bank, 336 Mass. 345, 145 N.E.2d 696 (1957); Shannonhouse v. Wolfe, 191
N.C. 769, 133 S.E. 93 (1926).
"
5See note 117 infra.
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As to the creation of powers of appointment, there are of course
hundreds of borderline cases involving the construction of ambig-
uous language, including the question whether certain words and
facts create a power or a trust.66 Typical cases involve directions by
a testator to his executor or another to distribute property among the
testator's "friends" or "relatives" or the like. These directions are
variously held to create an absolute gift to the named person,67 a
void trust for want of a definite beneficiary,6 or a valid power of
appointment with the named party as the donee.69 The wide range
of results is due in part to different requirements as to certainty of
objects for a power of appointment and the beneficiaries of a trust.
As will be seen, a group designation such as the testator's "friends"
is valid as a power if any appointee meets the description, but it is
invalid as a description of trust beneficiaries unless the court can say
of any given person that he was or was not a "friend" of the testator.
The Restatement of Property, promulgated in 1938, in discussing a
power of appointment with objects described by group designation,
stated that "if the group is so described that some persons might rea-
sonably be said to answer the description then the power is valid,
but an appointment thereunder may be invalid if it cannot be deter-
mined whether the appointee answers the description." 70
When it was originally published in 1935, the Restatement of
Trusts required generally that every trust to be valid must have a
definite beneficiary ascertainable within the perpetuities period.71
Honorary and discretionary trusts have been cited as exceptions to
the requirement of a definite beneficiary who can enforce the trust
or hold title to the equitable interest. Thus, a bequest "to such of
testator's friends and in such amounts as A shall select" creates a
valid power,72 but a bequest "to A in trust for such of testator's
friends as A shall select" is void as a trust for lack of definite bene-
00 3 POWELL 1 388 (1952); Simms & SMerr § 892.
07 Harvey v. Griggs, 12 Del. Ch. 232, 111 At. 437 (1920); Matter of Ostem, 11
Misc. 2d 179, 177 N.Y.S.2d 990 (Surr. Ct. 1958); Ralston v. Telfair, 17 N.C. 255 (1832);
Weiss v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 204 Tenn. 563, 322 S.W.2d 427 (1959).
08 Egleston v. Trust Co., 147 Ga. 313, 93 S.E. 878 (1917); Blunt v. Taylor, 230
Mass. 303, 119 N.E. 954 (1918).
OD Estate of Kuttler, 160 Cal. App. 332, 325 P.2d 624 (1958); In re Lidston's Estate,
32 Wash. 2d 408, 202 P.2d 259 (1949); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 323, comment e (1940).7 0 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 323, comment h (1940).
71 RESTATEMENT, TRusTs § 112 (1935). See also Folk v. Hughes, 100 S.C. 220, 84 S.E.
713 (1915).7 2 In re Rowlands' Estate, 73 Ariz. 337, 241 P.2d 781 (1952).
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ficiaries3 3 In passing upon the validity or invalidity of such an
arrangement, courts seem unwilling to distinguish between a trust
for the benefit of "objects of benevolence" or "public purposes" or
"friends," which is clearly void for uncertainty or lack of a definite
cestui, and a trust which gives the trustee a power to select from
among such persons or purposes. Unfortunately, this represents the
majority American view.74 In the 1959 revision of the Restatement
of Trusts, the necessity for an ascertainable beneficiary is retained,
but the selection of a beneficiary by the trustee or another person is
permitted under a power, unless the class is "so indefinite that it
cannot be ascertained whether any person falls within it."70 Thus
the arrangement may be upheld with a power of appointment if the
power is exclusive, and presumably it will be upheld as a trust after
the appointment occurs.7 6  However, this attempt to align trust law
with property law is "ought" law rather than "is" law, and a gift by
will "to my executor in trust to dispose of the same among my
friends" remains a trap for the unwary as a matter of trust law unless
the term "friends" is sufficiently certain for a court to be able to say
of any particular person that he either does or does not qualify as
such a "friend." 77
A power may be created subject to a condition precedent, 78 or it
may be in favor of single, multiple, or alternative donees.7 9 In spite
of arguments against the delegation of one's power to make a will
and violation of statutory formalities for wills and codicils, both
inter vivos and testamentary creation of a power of appointment to
alter one's will or dispose of his property are upheld on the theory
that the donee's exercise of the power is an event on which title
shifts from the donor to the appointee8 0 Although the objects of
73 Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 281, 133 AtI. 166 (1926).
71 Tilden v. Green, 130 N.Y. 29, 45, 28 N.E. 880, 881-82 (1891); 4 Scorr § 417.
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRusTs § 122 (1959).
18 1Id. § 120, comment c (1959); id. § 122, commcnt a.
77 Estate of Ralston, 1 Cal. 2d. 724, 37 P.2d 76 (1934); Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H.
281, 133 At. 166 (1926); see note 68 supra. See generally Palmer, The Effect of In.
definiteness on the Validity of Trusts and Powers of Appointment, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
241 (1963).
78 Bundy v. United States Trust Co., 257 Mass. 72, 153 N.E. 337 (1926); Massey v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 142 Neb. 237, 5 N.V.2d 279 (1942); Smith v. Garey, 22 N.C. 42
(1838).
79 Wooster v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 132 Conn. 309, 43 A.2d 734 (1945);
Maslen v. Kean, 4 N.C. 700 (1818).
80 Columbia Trust Co. v. Christopher, 133 Ky. 335, 117 S.W. 943 (1909); In re
McKaUip's Estate, 324 Pa. 438, 188 Ad. 343 (1936); In re Watts's Estate, 202 Pa. 85, 51
AUt. 588 (1902). Contra, Zierau v. Zierau, 347 111. 82, 179 N.E. 432 (1931).
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the power acquire no interest under it until an appointment is
made, once a power is created, it is irrevocable unless the donor has
retained a right to revoke it.81
As previously pointed out in the discussion of different types of
powers and the purposes to be served by them, the selection of the
type of power depends upon the objectives which the property owner
wishes to accomplish. If the purpose is to give the donee what
amounts for all practical purposes to a fee simple but without its
incidents and liabilities, this can be largely achieved by adding a
special or general testamentary power to a life estate. Such a donee
may be given a power to appoint to anyone in the world except him-
self, his estate, his creditors or the creditors of his estate and still
avoid taxation under the federal estate tax.82 The subject property
may be made taxable to the donee's estate and the benefit of the
marital deduction acquired by coupling the donee's legal or equita-
ble life estate with an inter vivos special power of appointment and
a general testamentary power of appointment over the remainder in
fee. Of course, one of the principal reasons for utilizing a power of
appointment is to achieve flexibility by giving wide discretionary
powers of appointment to the donee and thereby extending the
donor's ultimate property settlement into the distant future while
at the same time saving taxes and other costs.
In summary, the following points regarding the creation of
powers of appointment should be carefully dealt with: certainty as
to the type of power, whether general or special, presently exercis-
able or testamentary; explicit provision as to types of interests the
donee-may create in exercising the power, including the power to
create new powers; certainty that the power authorizes conveyance
of the fee when the donee of a power is life tenant of the appointive
property; allowance of blanket exercise or the requirement of ex-
press reference to the power; provision for exercise by an instrument
executed prior to the creation of the power; express designation of
the power as exclusive or nonexclusive; appointment of an alterna-
tive donee should the donee predecease the donor; inclusion of a
default clause covering total or partial failure of exercise and in-
clusion of a hotchpot clause if the power is special; provision allow-
ing or not allowing release, total or partial, and stating the mechan-
81
s RrTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 337 (1940).
82 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041.
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ics; express provision as to termination of the trust and transfer of
the property where a trustee is also donee of the power; specification
or other provision concerning the governing state law; and careful
calculation to make certain that the trust does not have a maximum
duration in excess of the perpetuities period when a corporate trus-
tee which may exercise the power or acquire such power by succes-
sion is involved.8 3
B. Exercise of Powers of Appointment
For the valid exercise of a power, the concurrence of three factors
must be established: that the transaction meets formal legal require-
ments, that the donee intended to exercise it, and that the exercise
is within its scope.84 Formal legal requirements for the exercise of
a power include the necessary legal capacity of the donee and the
proper form of the instrument employed, i.e., a legally valid
deed or will.8 5 To whatever extent the exercise of a power
of appointment is regarded as a mere event upon which the title
to property shifts and not as a conveyance, legal capacity of the
donee seems immaterial.8 6 However, since it is legal policy to pro-
tect persons who are non sui juris against their assumed indiscretion,
the present general requirement is that the donee must have the
same legal capacity with respect to the appointive assets as would be
required for a conveyance of his own property.8 7 As to release of
a power by an infant donee, the common law distinguished between
powers appendant and those in gross or merely collateral and re-
fused to sanction release of the first type because it involved the
infant's own property.88 No such distinctions were observed con-
cerning an adult married woman, and as donee of a power of appoint-
ment, she could transfer property which she could not otherwise con-
vey because of the disability of coverture. 9 Some states provide by
statute that the execution of a power by will requires a validly exe-
cuted will, something an infant is unable to do.00
"STEPHENSON §§ 4.11, 4.12.
" RE TATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 345-47 (1940).
"Id. § 346.
"0 SINins 8, SMiTH § 971.
87 3 PowaEL 399 (1952); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 345 (1940).
:8 Thompson v. Lyon, 20 Mo. 155 (1854); In re D'Angibau, 15 Ch. D. 228 (1880).
9 Taylor v. Eastman, 92 N.C. 601 (1885); Browning v. Bluegrass Hardware Co., 158
Va. 20, 149 S.E. 497 (1929); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 345 (1940).
"0 RETATEMENT, PROPERTY § 346 (1940); cf. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,
316 U.S. 56 (1942).
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Because it is not presently exercisable, the donee of a testamen-
tary power of appointment can neither exercise it by deed nor make
a binding contract to devise the appointive property.9 '
As hereafter noted, the question whether a special power is ex-
clusive or nonexclusive is one of construction, and the present-day
preference is for the finding of an exclusive power. By the older
strict rule, a special power to appoint "between" or "among" the
members of a group was usually construed as a nonexclusive power,
thus raising the question of illusory appointment. 2 As to the re-
quirement of special formalities in the execution of a power, such
as a condition that a will executing a testamentary power have more
than the legally required number of witnesses, 93 their observance is
generally mandatory, but in some states such unnecessary gestures
have been statutorily nullified.94
As to manifestation of an intent to exercise a power by deed or
by will, this may occur either by explicit language or by implication.
In the absence of an explicit exercise of a power by direct language,
it is a question of construction whether there has been a sufficient
manifestation by the donee of an intent to exercise the power.95 For
wills, a form of express exercise is the so-called blanket exercise
which disposes of the donee's owned and appointive property to-
gether to the same individuals, e.g., "all property which I own or over
which I have power of appointment I devise as follows ... ." Almost
without exception it is the common law rule that the gift in a will of
"all my estate" or "the residue of my estate" does not exercise a tes-
tamentary power of appointment, because the power is not prop-
erty.96 In a number of states there are statutes, some restricted to
general powers, which provide that a general or residuary devise or
01 Childs v. Gross, 41 Cal. App. 2d 680, 107 P.2d 424 (1940); Northern Trust Co. v.
Porter, 368 Ill. 256, 13 N.E.2d 487 (1938); United States Trust Co. v. Montclair Trust
Co., 133 NJ. Eq. 579, 33 A.2d 901 (Ch. 1943); Reid v. Boushall, 107 N.C. 345, 12 S.E.
324 (1890); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 340 (1940).
02 See notes 124-27 infra.
01 Hutchinson v. Farmer, 190 Md. 411, 58 A.2d 638 (1948); National Shawmut Bank
v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1944); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 346 (1940).
"1 These states include Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
9" Northern Trust Co. v. Cudahy, 339 Ill. App. 603, 91 N.E.2d 607 (1950); REsTATE-
MENT, PROPERTY § 342 (1940).
'a Emery v. Emery, 325 II. 212, 156 N.E. 364 (1927); In re Proestler's Will, 232
Iowa 640, 5 N.W.2d 922 (1942); Trust Co. v. Nichols, 62 N.J. Super. 495, 163 A.2d 205
(Ch. 1960); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 343 (1940). Contra, Slayton v. Fitch Home, Inc.,
293 Mass. 574, 200 N.E. 357 (1936) (general power). See 43 B.U.L. REV. 338 (1963).
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bequest of a testator's property includes property over which he has
a testamentary power of appointment unless a contrary intent ap-
pears by the will.97 These statutes seem justifiable because of the
wide use of general testamentary language and the proneness to
regard appointive property as one's own, especially where the donee
has a life estate with a testamentary power of appointment over the
remainder.
According to the common law, a deed or will which did not
specifically refer to a power was presumed not to exercise it.08 In the
language of Justice Story, often repeated in the cases, three classes
of cases are held to exercise a power: those where there is a reference
to the power, those where there is a reference to the appointive prop-
erty, and those where the provision in the will or other instrument
executed by the donee of the power would be ineffectual unless it
exercised the power.99 Specific reference to the power seems the
clearest evidence of intent to exercise it. If the donee had a life
estate in the property and a power to appoint the fee by deed or will
and appointed by deed without mention of the power, it has been
held that only his life estate passed because an intent to exercise
the power was not clearly manifested;100 however, the better reason-
ing and result would transfer the fee.101 If the donee owns no other
interest and conveys the property by description of the appointive
assets but without mention of the power, this constitutes an exercise
of the power under Story's second or third class. 10 2 A power may be
exercised by implication when this seems to be required to carry
out the purpose expressed by the donee of the power.
0 3
OT3 POwELL 397 n.38 (1952); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 343 (1940). See also
Schaeffer v. Haseltine, 228 N.C. 484, 46 S.E.2d 463 (1948); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-43
(1950). For what may constitute sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, see 9
WIGmORE, EVmENc E §§ 2461-72 (3d ed. 1940).
9 8 Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Huntington, 149 Conn. 331, 179 A.2d 604 (1962);
Northern Trust Co. v. House, 3 Ill. App. 2d 10, 120 N.E.2d 234 (1954); Fidelity Union
Trust Co. v. Byrne, 76 N.J. Super. 256, 184 A.2d 163 (Ch. 1962); RESTATEMENT, PRo11.
ERTY § 343 (1940).
09 Blagge v. Miles, 3 Fed. Gas. 559 (No. 1479) (.C.D. Nrass. 1841); Funk v. Eggleston,
92 Ill. 515 (1879).
100 Herring v. Williams, 158 N.C. 1, 73 S.E. 218 (1911). But see Hood v. N. C.
Theatres, Inc., 210 N.C. 346, 186 S.E. 345 (1936), seemingly applying the statutory
wills presumption to a deed.
10 1Farlow v. Farlow, 83 Md. 118, 34 Ad. 837 (1896).
102Lee v. Simpson, 134 U.S. 572 (1890); In re Stork, 233 Iowa 413, 9 N.W.2d 273
(1943); Hood v. Francis, 137 N.J. Eq. 200, 44 A.2d 182 (Ch. 1945); Toeci v. Nowfiall,
220 N.C. 550, 18 S.E.2d 225 (1942); Lowe v. Ragland, 156 Tex. 504, 297 SAV.2d 668
(1957).
103Board of Home Missions v. Saltmer, 125 N.J. Eq. 33, 4 A.2d 69 (Ch. 1939);
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To summarize regarding exercise of powers of appointment,
certain points previously mentioned should be carefully observed.
The exercise of a power of appointment requires no particular word
formula, and as indicated, it is a question of the intention of the
donee, provided the proper formalities have been met. However,
the instrument which creates a power of appointment should specify
with particularity the manner of its exercise, and in the exercise of
the power by the donee, specific reference to the creating instrument
and to the power should be made. Also, if there are particular
restrictions, such as the giving of written notice to the trustees of
the property or the procurement of the required consent of another
person, these should be carefully observed and followed. Where a
special power is being exercised, the draftsman should be very care-
ful to see that the appointees are objects of the power; and if the
creating language of the power leaves open the possibility that the
power might be nonexclusive, then a substantial appointment should
be made to each object of the power. Express exercise or non-
exercise is the only safe rule. If future interests or additional powers
are to be created by the exercise of the power, particular care is
necessary for protection against violation of the Rule Against Per-
petuities,104 especially in states having the statutory rule that the
residuary clause of a will presumptively exercises any testamentary
power held by the testator.105 Here the draftsman of the will must
be careful to distinguish between owned and appointive property.
In determining whether a power should be exercised, general and
special powers differ when there is no default clause. If the power is
special, failure to exercise the power may result in the court's making
a per capita distribution of the property to the objects of the power
either by treating it as an imperative power or power in trust
or by implying a gift in default of appointment to them.10 If a
general and unexercised power is involved, the property usually
Woody v. Pickelsimer, 248 N.C. 599, 104 S.E.2d 273 (1958); Buncombe County v.
Wood, 216 N.C. 224, 4 S.E.2d 505 (1939); Johnston v. Knight, 117 N.C. 122, 23 S.E. 92
(1895).10 See note 159 infra.
10 See note 97 supra.
106 First Portland Nat'1 Bank v. Rodrique, 157 Me. 277, 172 A.2d 107 (1961); Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology v. Loring, 327 Mass. 553, 99 N.E.2d 854 (1951);
Henderson v. Western Carolina Power Co., 200 N.C. 443, 157 S.E. 425 (1931); Bridge-
water v. Turner, 161 Tenn. 111, 29 S.W.2d 659 (1930); REsTATEMENT, PROPERTY §
367 (2)- (4) (1940).
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reverts to the donor or his estate. 10 7 However, if an attempted exer-
cise is ineffective, it may be awarded to the donee or his estate under
the doctrine of capture, whether or not there is a default clause. 108
If there is a default clause, as to the power's exercise, the donee must
consider, in addition to such factors as taxes and subjection to claims
of the donee's creditors or his surviving spouse's rights, whether the
form of the default clause is sufficiently explicit to avoid litigation
over the shares in which the takers in default will receive the prop-
erty, and whether they are capable, both legally and practically, of
being its owners as the clause provides. 109
VI
SCOPE OF POWERS oF APPOINTMENT-GENERAL AND SPECIAL
As to the scope of the power granted, there are several different
aspects in which it may be greater or less. First, the donor may give
the donee carte blanche in the choice of appointees, or he may im-
pose rigid restrictions or negligible ones. The principal classifica-
tions in this respect are the general power and the special power,
which have been discussed earlier. If property is transferred to A
for life, remainder as he shall appoint, this creates a general power,
and A can appoint the remainder to anybody in the world, including
himself or his estate. 110 Between general and special powers then,
the determining factor is whether or not the donee may appoint
to himself or his estate. Under a special power, the donee is restricted
to appointing to a specifically named group of persons and cannot
appoint to himself either directly or indirectly."'
Second, as to a special power, the donor can limit not only the
objects but also the type of interests the donee may create in the
appointees. 1 2  Under a general power the donee has absolute right
107Oglesby v. Springfield Marine Bank, 385 Ill. 414, 52 N.E.2d 1000 (1944); Bond
v. Moore, 90 N.C. 235 (1884); Harris v. Battle, 21 N.C. 213 (1835); Polen v. Baird, 125
W.Va. 682, 25 S.E.2d 767 (1943); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 367 (1) (1940).
20 8 Fiduciary Trust v. Mishou, 321 Mass. 615, 75 N.E.2d 3 (1947); Talbott v. Riggs,
287 Mass. 144, 191 N.E. 360 (1934); 3 POWELL 402 (1952); RESTATE1MENT, PROPERTY§ 365 (1940).
119 See STEPHENSON §§ 4.11, 4.12.
210 Frank v. Frank, 305 Ill. 181, 137 N.E. 151 (1922); Mabry v. Brown, 162 N.C. 178,
78 S.E. 78 (1913); Stroud v. Morrow, 52 N.C. 357 (1860); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 320
(1940).
"'
1Horne v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 79 F. Supp. 91 (S.D. Cal. 1948); Pitman v.
Pitman, 314 Mass. 465, 50 N.E.2d 69 (1943); Holt v. Hogan, 58 N.C. 78 (1859). Jut see
First Portland Nat'l Bank v. Rodrique, 157 Me. 277, 172 A.2d 107 (1961).
112 Culbreth v. Caison, 220 N.C. 717, 18 S.E.2d 136 (1942).
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as to both types of interest creatable and possible appointees. It is
well settled that the donee of a general power may appoint the sub-
ject property with the same freedom that he might convey his own
property because he can first appoint it to himself and then convey
it as owner.113 He may appoint the property outright or in trust,114
create life estates and future interests,".5 create new powers and im-
pose conditions and limitations upon such appointment,"16 or mort-
gage the property."17 The donee of a special power may, with certain
exceptions, appoint the property in the same way. As to the scope of
a power in terms of interests creatable thereunder, if the creating
instrument is not specific, litigation to construe the instrument and
find the donor's intent is likely. This is particularly true where a
power is special as distinguished from general. However, for both
the creation and exercise of powers, the only safe course is explicit
draftsmanship.
VII
SPECIAL SCOPE PROBLEMS OF SPECIAL POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
There are a number of other aspects of the scope of a special
power: e.g., (1) its objects, (2) the interests creatable under it, (3)
whether it is exclusive or nonexclusive, (4) whether it is mandatory
or discretionary, (5) whether it is releasable in whole or in part, and
(6) whether new powers may be created. These may be illustrated
by reference to the following hypothetical disposition: T devises
property to his son A for life, with power to appoint the remainder
among A's children as he shall see fit, and to the extent that it is not
effectively appointed, the remainder is to pass to A's children in fee
simple. This is a common type of provision which on its face seems
sufficiently certain, but it is in fact replete with legal problems.
(1) As to the objects of a special power, since the designation is
18 Regents of the Univ. Sys. v. Trust Co., 186 Ga. 498, 198 S.E. 345 (1938); Hicks v.
Ward, 107 N.C. 303, 12 S.E. 318 (1890); RESTATEMrENT, PROPERTY § 356, comment b(1940).
" Wilmington Trust Co. v. Sloane, 30 Del. Ch. 103, 54 A.2d 544 (1947); Regents
of the Univ. Sys. v. Trust Co., supra note 113; Matter of Finucane, 193 Misc. 439, 82
N.Y.S.2d 471 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
2r Equitable Trust Co. v. James, 29 Del. Ch. 166, 47 A.2d 303 (1946); Lamkin v.
Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 192 Md. 472, 64 A.2d 704 (1949); Matter of Finucane, supra
note 114.
21' Marx v. Rice, 1 N.J. 574, 65 A.2d 48 (1949); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 356,
comment d (1940).
21 7 Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Heymann, 220 N.C. 526, 17 S.E.2d 665 (1941);
Ferrell v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 211 N.C. 423, 190 S.E. 746 (1937).
Vol. 1964: 32]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
by a group or class description, its creation involves the construction
or definitional problems of class gifts such as the inclusionary and
exclusionary force of terms like heirs, issue, and children.",, Any
appointment to or for a non-object of the power is void."19 Since
the above hypothetical power confines appointment to A's children,
grandchildren would ordinarily be excluded. 20  Also, in case a child
of A predeceased him, leaving a widow or a widow and issue, pro-
vision could not be made for them under this power.12 ' Thus, the
inclusion of a definitional clause in the creating instrument clari-
fying such key dispositive words as "children," "issue," and "heirs"
would seem to be in order. When the donee exercises the power, he
encounters not only the definitional aspects of class gifts if he
appoints to a class, but also such additional problems as the rules con-
cerning class closing, lapse, survivorship, shares and such, many of
which can be eliminated by careful drafting.122
(2) As to the interests creatable by the donee, the language of the
hypothetical power gives no clue as to whether the donee may ap-
point in trust or create limited interests with remainders. The
general rule is that there is no prohibition on this type of exercise,
and in the absence of a contrary direction, the donee of a special
power is privileged to do any of the things allowed for a general
power, provided it does not benefit a non-object of the power.123
Certainly in the average case, the donee of such a power should be
permitted to create not only limited estates and interests but also
appropriate trusts required under the circumstances. As to both the
objects of the power and types of interests creatable by the exercise
11s Casner, Class Gifts-Definitional Aspects, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1941); Long, Class
Gifts in North Carolina, 22 N.C.L. REv. 297 (1944); Schuyler, Class Gifts in Illinois,
34 ILL. L. RiLv. 893 (1940).
119 Matter of Kennedy, 279 N.Y. 255, 18 N.E.2d 146 (1938); Hodges v. Stegall, 169
Tenn. 202, 83 S.W.2d 901 (1935).
120 Equitable Trust Co. v. Foulke, 28 Del. Ch. 238, 40 A.2d 713 (1945); Matter ot
Kennedy, supra note 119; Carson v. Carson, 62 N.C. 50 (1866).
121 Equitable Trust Co. v. Foulke, supra note 120; Rankin v. Hoyle, 41 N.C. 123
(1848); In re Lewis' Estate, 349 Pa. 571, 37 A.2d 482 (1944). But see Carson v. Carson,
supra note 120.
122 Bolich, Some Common Problems Incident to Drafting Dispositive Provisions of
Donative Instruments, 35 N.C.L. REv. 17, 23-30 (1956); Phillips, Some Suggestions to
Will Draftsmen: Complex Dispositive Provisions in General, Class Gift Provisions in
Particular, 40 N.C.L. REv. 23 (1961).
12" Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Taylor, 133 Conn. 221, 50 A.2d 168 (1946);
Welch v. Morse, 323 Mass. 233, 81 N.E.2d 361 (1948); Matter of Hopkins, 72 N.Y.S.2J
702 (Surr. Ct. 1947); In re McNeile's Estate, 217 Pa. 179, 66 Atl. 328 (1907); REsTATE.-
,MENT, PROPERTY §§ 856-57 (1940).
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of the power, great care must be exercised in the creation of a special
power in order to provide for various possible changes of circum-
stances which may arise. Draftsmen must have an eye for both pre-
cision of meaning and latitude of action. Assuredly, in our example
T would have desired his daughter-in-law or his grandchild to bene-
fit or a spendthrift to be protected against his indiscretion by an
appropriate trust. It is the lawyer's duty to peer into the future with
his client in this respect and guide his thinking. Unless there is
an attempt to foresee the contingencies, a special power of this kind
may be entirely too limited to provide for the unknown future.
(3) Whether the power is exclusive or nonexclusive is not made
clear by the creating language. May the donee discriminate be-
tween his children by appointing unequally among them or by en-
tirely eliminating one or more of them? It is generally said that a
special power is presumed to be exclusive,124 but courts naturally
turn such decisions on the words used,12 5 and one cannot afford to
invite construction litigation when drafting can be explicit on this
point. However, it should be pointed out that the minimum cannot
be too small because application of the illusory appointment rule
requires that each appointee receive a substantial sum. 26 Although
some states repudiate this doctrine, 27 in those where the rule applies,
the minimum should be designated when the power is drafted, possi-
bly expressed as a percentage of the available fund.
(4) Whether exercise of the power is mandatory or discretionary
raises the question whether it is a mere special power or the type of
power known as a power in trust. The Restatement classifies powers
merely as general or special, and because a power is discretionary, it
does not accept the common law power in trust concept which is an
imperative power. 28  As to it, the Restatement of Trusts says the
donee is a trustee of the power of appointment, the subject of the
.2 Harlow v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 251 S.W.2d 284 (Ky. 1952); Moore v. Emery, 137
Me. 259, 18 A.2d 781 (1941); National State Bank v. Morrison, 7 N.J. Super. 333, 70
A.2d 888 (Ch. 1949), modified, 9 N.J. Super. 552, 75 A.2d 916 (Ch. 1950); Matter of
Barbot, 144 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Surr. Ct. 1955); REsTATExMENT, PROPERTY § 360 (1940).
128 POWELL 398 nn.90 & 91 (1952).
120 Hatchett v. Hatchett, 103 Ala. 556, 16 So. 550 (1893); Matter of Sloan's Estate, 7
Cal. App. 2d 319, 46 P.2d 1007 (1935); REsTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 361 (1940).
127 Hawthorn v. Ulrich, 207 Ill. 430, 69 N.E. 885 (1904); Hodges v. Stegall, 169 Tenn
202, 83 S.W.2d 901 (1935).
28 RESATEmENT, PROPERTY §§ 820, 323 (1940).
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trust, and that there must be a definite cestui for its validity,12 sub-
ject to a 1959 amendment sanctioning his selection by the trustee or
another under a power.130 As previously pointed out, the power in
trust concept is recognized in some states; and although equity will
not normally enforce or aid the nonexecution of a power of appoint-
ment because it involves a personal discretion, if it finds the power
to be in the nature of a trust, it may divide the appointive property
equally among the objects of an unexercised power.131
(5) As to release of a power by the donee, general powers are
freely releasable, 132 and the same is now usually true for special
powers, except powers in trust. 133  However, the common law de-
cisions are not uniform. Allowing the donee to release his power
aids alienation and may enhance the value of the property and estate
in question under certain circumstances; but in the case of a testa-
mentary power, release frustrates the donor's intent that the donee's
discretion should not be foreclosed until his death, 34 and in prin-
ciple it is contrary to the rules forbidding inter vivos exercise of the
power or a contract to exercise it.Y5 If a power is releasable, a re-
lease may be effected at common law by delivery of an instrument
under seal or upon consideration so stating to a person who would
be adversely affected by an appointment, 136 by a contract with such
person, 37 or by the donee's joining the takers in default in a con-
veyance of the property subject to the power. 138 The Federal Rev-
enue Act of 1942 provided that a special power conforming to statu-
tory specifications would cause the appointive assets not to be in-
129 RiESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 27 (1959).
'10 See note 75 supra.
131 See note 106 supra.
132 Weil v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 681, 180 F. Supp. 407, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822
(1960); McFall v. Kirkpatrick, 236 Ill. 281, 86 N.E. 139 (1908); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 334 (1940).
12 Chickering v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 254 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 636
(1941); Hill v. Sangamon Loan & Trust Co., 302 Ill. 33, 134 N.E. 112 (1922); RSTATE-
IENT, PROPERTY § 35 (Supp. 1948); Nossaman, Release of Powers of Appointment, 56
HARv. L. REv. 757 (1943).
234 O'Hara v. O'Hara, 185 Md. 321, 44 A.2d 813 (1945).
122 See note 91 supra.
26 District of Columbia v. Lloyd, 160 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Merrill v. Lynch,
173 Misc. 69, 13 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Sup. Ct. 1939); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 336 (1) (1940).
127Hill v. Sangamon Loan & Trust Co., 302 Ill. 3, 134 N.E. 112 (1922); RESTATE-
MENT, PROPERTY § 36(3) (1940). But see Browne v. Hendley, 216 Ga. 411, 116 S.E.2d
537 (1960).
13 8Voncannon v. Hudson Belk Co., 236 N.C. 709, 73 S.E.2d 875 (1953); RETATV-
MENT, PROPERTY § 36 (2) (1940).
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cluded in the donee's estate for federal estate tax purposes and
allowed donees to release their present powers without gift tax
liability.139 This produced a rash of state statutes permitting release
of powers of appointment,140 which caused the Restatement of Prop-
erty to change its position regarding the release of special powers by
permitting their release, whether inter vivos or testamentary, unless
the donor had expressed a contrary intent.141 The terms of these
statutes vary, and some may be of limited value because they deal
merely with the formalities of release of a power which is releasable
at common law.142 Of course, any donee may refuse to accept a
power by renunciation or disclaimer, but this is a different matter
from the right to release a power which has been accepted. 14
3  It
would seem desirable when drafting a power to provide specifically
whether release is permissible in whole or in part and to specify the
mechanics of a release. The desirability of specifically sanctioning
the release of special powers may be questioned in view of their na-
ture and the donor's apparent desire to benefit the objects.
(6) As to the donee's creation of new powers, when allowed, al-
though analogous to a delegation of his discretion, creation is gen-
erally upheld provided a non-object is not thereby benefited.144
Powers, of course, are personal and cannot be delegated 145 or as-
signed, 46 and, if unexercised, die with the donee.147  As stated ear-
lier, the discretion to create a new power by an exercise of one's
special power may be very desirable, especially if the appointment is
in trust. Every well-drafted power should always include an explicit
provision with regard to creation of new powers by its exercise; other-
wise, a troublesome problem of construction is always present.
'I' Federal Revenue Act of 1942, §§ 403 (d) (3), 452 (c), 56 Stat. 944, 952, amending
INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §§ 811 (f), 812(d) 826(d), 861(a)(3), 1000(c) (now INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2041, 2055, 2106 (2) (B), 2207, 2514 (a)).
140 3 POWELL 394 n.93 (1952) lists 30 states having such statutes.
1 4 1 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 504-09 (Supp. 1948).
1412 3 POWELL 394 n.93 (1952); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 39-33, 39-36 (1950) seem a prime
example.
-2 SIMiEs & SMITH § 1061.
'"National State Bank v. Morrison, 7 N.J. Super. 333, 70 A.2d 888 (Ch. 1949),
modified, 9 N.J. Super. 552, 75 A.2d 916 (Ch. 1950); In re Hopkins' Estate, 72 N.Y.S.2d
702 (Surr. Ct. 1947); RESTATETMENT, PROPERTY § 359 (1940).
145 Thayer v. Rivers, 179 Mass. 280, 60 N.E. 796 (1901).
140 Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Morrissey, 329 Mass. 601, 109 N.E.2d 821 (1953).
117 Henwood Trust, 11 Fid. Rep. 199 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1961). But see Haslen v.




SOME COMMON LEGAL PROBLEMS REGARDING CREATION AND
EXERCISE OF POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
A. Exercise Before the Power is Created
As to date of creation and date of exercise, a power cannot be
exercised by the donee's deed or will which becomes operative
before the power is created, but a power in existence at the donee's
death, although created after the execution of his will, may be exer-
cised by it.148 Though a power cannot in logic be exercised before
its creation, courts sometimes avoid the consequences of this fact and
uphold such appointments in hard cases by various devices, including
the doctrine of incorporation by reference and acts having inde-
pendent legal significance. 49 It is usual to provide expressly for
such appointments.
B. Gift in Default of Appointment
Whether a power is general or special, it seems mandatory that a
gift in default of appointment be included. If the gift in default
is not carefully drafted or is not included, litigation is almost certain
to occur if the power is not exercised by the donee. As previously
stated, when there is a general power and no gift in default and the
power is not exercised, the property reverts to the donor or his
estate; but if an attempted exercise is ineffective, the doctrine of
capture may result in the property being awarded to the donee or
his estate, even though there is a default clause. Ir0 If a special power
is unexercised, the court may imply an appointment to the objects
of the power and make a per capita distribution of the property.' 16
Not only should there be a well-drafted default clause in terms of
takers and nonexercise, but it should also provide for defective or
partial exercise by the making of a gift over "to the extent that the
power is not effectively exercised," instead of the conventional for-
mula of yesterday, "in default of and until appointment." Possibly
a hotchpot provision should also be included.
"I8 Curley v. Lynch, 206 Mass. 289, 92 N.E. 429 (1910); Matter of Davis, 186 Misc.
397, 59 N.Y.S.2d 607 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Matter of Mayo, 76 Misc. 416, 136 N.Y.S. 1066
(1912); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 344, 348 (1940).
119 Bemis v. Fletcher, 251 Mass. 178, 146 N.E. 277 (1925); Matter of Fowles, 222
N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918); 26 HARV. L. REv. 91 (1912); see RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 348, comments e, f (1940).
250 See notes 107, 108 supra.
151 See note 106 supra.
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C. Lapse and Pretermission
If a legatee or devisee predeceases the testator, the gift lapses
except to the extent that the will itself or an anti-lapse statute pro-
vides a substitute taker, and such statutes now exist in nearly every
state.152 In a typical power of appointment case, T by will creates a
general testamentary power of appointment. If the donee prede-
ceases the donor, it is usually held that the power lapses or never
comes into being.153 If the donee- survives and makes an appoint-
ment by his will and the appointee predeceases him, courts generally
disregard the relation back theory and apply an otherwise applicable
anti-lapse statute to the appointed property just as though the donee
were the testator-owner.15 4  As to the application of an anti-lapse
statute to a special testamentary power, it can in no event apply
unless the statutory substitute taker is an object of the power.1 55
Even where the substitute taker is an object and also bears the
required relationship to the donee,156 since the donee of a special
power is in no sense regarded as the owner of the property, an anti-
lapse statute should not apply on any such theory, regardless of
intent.
By virtue of statute in nearly every state, if a child is omitted
from his parent's will, under certain conditions he is entitled to his
intestate share of the estate. 57 On reasoning similar to the lapse
cases, some courts permit such a pretermitted child to share in prop-
erty appointed by the donee-parent as if he owned it. 5s Since these
statutes are designed to effectuate a testator's presumed intent, it
would seem that the donee's intent is the intent at issue where the
appointment is made by will and the appointee predeceases the
donee-testator or pretermission of a child occurs. Thus, both as to
' ' 3 POWELL 367 (1952); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 298, comment c (1940).
" In re McCurdy's Estate, 197 Cal. 276, 240 Pac. 498 (1925); Curley v. Lynch, 206
Mass. 289, 92 N.E. 429 (1910).
'I' Newton v. Bullard, 181 Ga. 448, 182 S.E. 614 (1935); Thompson v. Pew, 214
Mas. 520, 102 N.E. 122 (1913); In re Goodman, 155 N.Y.S.2d 424 (Sup. Ct. 1956); RE-
STATEMENT, PROPERTY § 350 (1940); 4 DurE BA.J. 119 (1936).
L5 Daniel v. Brown, 156 Va. 563, 159 S.E. 209 (1931).
IL" 3 POWELL 1 399 (1952); SImEs & SmTH § 984. See also Bolich, Acts Barring
Property Rights, 40 N.C.L. REv. 175, 212-13 (1962) for a discussion of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 31A-10 (2) (Supp. 1961), a statutory provision where an appointee willfully and
unlawfully kills the donee.
157 ATKINSON, WIIS § 36 (2d ed. 1953).
153 Commonwealth v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 285 Ky. 1, 146 S.W.2d 3 (1q40);
In re Schoch's Estate, 271 Pa. 158, 114 Ad. 502 (1921). Contra, Rhode Island Hosp.
Trust Co. v. Anthony, 49 R.I. 339, 142 Atl. 531 (1928).
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testamentary creation and exercise of powers, it is in order to provide
for the possibility of the donee predeceasing the donor or the ap-
pointee, and the pretermission of a child.
D. Application of the Rule Against Perpetuities
In both the creation and exercise of powers of appointment, the
Rule Against Perpetuities constitutes an ever present danger. This
is particularly true when substantial wealth is involved and every
effort is being made to minimize taxes through the utilization of
trusts, powers of appointment, and future interests designed to shield
the property involved to the full extent allowed by the common law
or some other rule against perpetuities. Thus, the second or even the
third estate tax on the property may be avoided by the use of life
estates and remainders for the maximum period the Rule Against
Perpetuities allows ultimate disposition to be postponed.
In the creation of powers of appointment, the draftsman should
hoist the red flag of danger if the donee is a natural person who is
not in esse when the power is created, or even though he is in esse,
whenever the power may be exercised by a successor-donee who is not
in esse at the date of creation of the original power. Likewise, where
a corporate donee may exercise the power in favor of persons not in
esse at its creation, caution is counselled. For a general power pres-
ently exercisable to be valid, it must become exercisable, if at all,
within the perpetuities period which, at common law, is lives in
being at the creation of the power and twenty-one years plus any
actual gestation periods involved.1 9 Therefore, such a power given
to the survivor of a class of unborn persons is invalid because the
donee may not be ascertained within the allowable period. Thus
a conveyance to A for life, remainder to his first son for life with a
general power to appoint by deed when he attains age twenty-two is
void if A has no son living when the conveyance is made.0 0 That
an actual exercise of the power may occur beyond the period is imma-
terial because the objective of the Rule Against Perpetuities is to
prevent the undue tying up of property, and a general power pres-
ently exercisable is regarded as the equivalent of absolute ownership
because the donee can at any time make himself the complete owner.
1 l GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 473 (4th ed. 1942); RESTATEmENT,
PROPERTY § 374 (1940).
160 Appeal of Mifflin, 121 Pa. 205, 15 At. 525 (1888); In re Hargreaves, 43 Ch. D.
401 (1890); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 390(1) (1940).
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Thus, it is only necessary that it be certain at the moment of its
creation that such a power will either be freed of any condition
precedent to its exercise or that it will fail within the period of the
Rule.161  As to creation of all special powers and of general testa-
mentary powers, they are treated alike and are valid only if it is not
possible for the power to be exercised beyond the period of the Rule
Against Perpetuities. Thus, a conveyance to A for life, remainder
to his first son for life, remainder as he shall appoint by will is void
if A has no son living when the conveyance is made. 62
While it seems that with few exceptions an indestructable private
trust may not have a perpetual duration,' 63 it is settled that since the
Rule Against Perpetuities is concerned only with vesting, the dura-
tion of a private trust is not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities
if the interests are vested,164 and the administrative powers of the
trustee of such a trust are also valid.165 However, if a discretionary
or "sprinkling" trust is so created that it may last beyond the per-
petuities period, with the corporate trustee having power to sprinkle
income among the beneficiaries, to pay out or accumulate income,
or to distribute corpus to or among such beneficiaries, such a power
is void if it might be exercised at a time beyond the perpetuities
period. "6 Thus, if a testamentary trust is created to sprinkle income
and to pay out or accumulate income or to distribute corpus at the
trustee's discretion among the testator's children and grandchildren
for their lives and at the death of the survivor to transfer the corpus
to a named charity, all the interests are vested. However, the pro-
vision for the grandchildren who were not living at the testator's
death is void because the trustee's special power of appointment may
be exercised beyond the period of the Rule. In essence the discre-
101 Bray v. Bree, 2 Clark & F. 453, 6 Eng. Rep. 1225 (H.L. 1834).
22 Northern Trust Co. v. Porter, 368 Ill. 256, 13 N.E.2d 487 (1938); Hopkinson v.
Swaim, 284 Ill. 11, 119 N.E. 985 (1918); Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Scott, 121
N.J. Eq. 366, 189 At. 653 (Ct. Err. & App. 1937); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 390 (2)
(1940). Contra, Miller v. Douglass, 192 Wis. 486, 213 N.W. 320 (1927).
103 5 POWELL 772 (1962); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 378, 381 (1940); Morray, The
Rule Against Prolonged Indestructibility of Private Trusts, 44 ILL. L. REv. 467 (1949).
10' Trippe v. National Newark & Essex Banking Co., 98 N.J. Eq. 462, 131 At. 162
(Ch. 1925); McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E.2d 831 (1952).
"1 Melvin v. Hoffman, 290 Mo. 464, 235 SAV. 107 (1921); RESTATEMIENT, PROPERTY
§ 382 (1940).
260 Davenport v. Davenport Foundation, 36 Cal. 2d 67, 222 P.2d 11 (1950); Bundy
v. United States Trust Co., 257 Mass. 72, 153 N.E. 337 (1926); Re Hubbard's Will Trusts




tionary trust is a special power of appointment, although it is not
always so recognized.167 Because of its frequent use in discretionary
and other trusts, another matter to be borne in mind for trusts which
may last longer than the perpetuities period is the rule against
accumulations which makes a power to accumulate income liable to
invalidity on the ground that such accumulation is illegal. At
common law the allowable accumulation period is the same as the
Rule Against Perpetuities, 68 and this is the rule in most American
states, although the period has been shortened by statute in some
jurisdictions. 69 As to any testamentary discretionary trust or ac-
cumulation trust which might last beyond the perpetuities period,
in order to prevent invalidity on the ground of infraction of the
rules stated above, it should be specifically provided that twenty-
one years after the death of the last survivor of named or identified
persons living at the testator's death, accumulation should terminate
and income should be paid currently, and sprinkling of income or
principal among beneficiaries should likewise cease at that time. In
view of such considerations, it would seem wise to limit the duration
of a private trust to the applicable perpetuities period, both because
the maximum common law period would ordinarily provide a cen-
tury of duration and because such a durational rule seems to be
crystallizing. 70
As to the exercise of powers of appointment, different rules apply
to general powers presently exercisable and to all special powers and
general testamentary powers. Since a general power presently exer-
cisable is the practical equivalent of ownership in terms of freedom
of alienation, the time for validity of appointments under such a
power for purposes of the Rule Against Perpetuities is calculated
from the date of exercise of the powerY.7  On the other hand, if the
power is a special power and is exercisable by deed or will or if it
is a general power exercisable only by will, the validity of such ap-
pointments for purposes of the Rule Against Perpetuities is meas-
ured from the date of the creation of the power because the donee
1 7 See Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 113 S.E.2d 899 (1960).
168 Burdick v. Burdick, 123 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Equitable Trust Co. v. Ward,
29 Del. Ch. 206, 48 A.2d 519 (1946); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Otis, 77 R.I. 296,
75 A.2d 210 (1950); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 441 (1940).
166 3 PowEL. 831 (1952).
170 See Morray, supra note 163.
271 Appeal of Mifflin, 121 Pa. 205, 15 At. 525 (1888); RESTATE ENT, PROPERTY § 391(1940).
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may not at will make himself the complete owner.17 2 For both a
general testamentary power and a special power, a different rule is
applicable under the doctrine of the "second look." Under this
doctrine, an appointment is invalid under the Rule Against Per-
petuities only to the extent that its exercise or limitation, construed
in the light of the circumstances existent when the power is exer-
cised but measured for the purpose of applying the Rule from the
time when the power was created, violates the Rule because such
appointed interests are not certain to vest within that time. For
example, if property is bequeathed in trust to pay the income to the
testator's son A for life, remainder as he shall appoint by will to his
children, and A by will appoints the income to his children for life,
remainder at the death of the survivor of his children to his lineal
descendants then living, such an appointment is valid if A's only
children were in esse at the testator's death.173 Thus, the facts are
judged not on the basis of what might have happened in the future
as of the date of the donor-testator's death but on the basis of what
has happened between the date of the testator's death and the date
of the appointment by the donee, and then on the basis of what
might happen after the date of the appointment. This enables the
donee of a general testamentary power or of a special power of
appointment to appoint interests which the donor himself, the tes-
tator in this case, could not have validly created.
Since an appointment under a testamentary power or a special
power must, subject to the doctrine of the "second look," be read
back into the creating instrument, the risk of making invalid ap-
pointments by oversight is acute in the case of the blending of the
donee's own property with property over which he has such a power
of appointment. Thus, if the donee creates a residuary trust "of all
the residue of my estate, including property over which I shall hold
any power of appointment," such a trust is often valid as to his own
property but invalid as to the appointive property.174 While it is
not the common law rule, in many states a residuary clause is by
'1- Northern Trust Co. v. Porter, 368 Ill. 256, 13 N.E.2d 487 (1938); American Trust
Co. v. Williamson, 228 N.C. 458, 46 S.E.2d 104 (1948); REsrA EMENT, PROPERTY § 392(1940).
1' Sears v. Coolidge, 329 Mass. 340, 108 N.E.2d 563 (1952); In re Warren's Estate,
320 Pa. 112, 182 At. 396 (1936); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 392 (1940); Newhall, Doc-
trine of the "Second Look," 92 TRUSTS & ESTATES 13 (1953).
7 Amerige v. Attorney Gen., 324 Mass. 648, 88 N.E.2d 126 (1949).
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statute deemed to exercise testamentary powers of appointment.'
Therefore, by way of protection against inadvertant exercise, the
creator of a power of appointment should require that it be spe-
cifically referred to in order to be exercised, or the draftsman of the
donee's will should either expressly negate the exercise of the par-
ticular power or include a clause which excludes the exercise of any
power of appointment which is not specifically referred to in the will.
E. Conflict of Laws
The increasingly peripatetic habits of Americans and the multi-
state contacts of property ownership underscore the necessity for the
estate planner and draftsman to be alert to certain conflict of laws
problems lest his client's estate plan and its disposition be frustrated
by the application of arbitrary conflicts rules which might have been
averted by proper foresight and drafting. While the hazard of
attempting to suggest reliable guidelines in this area of law is recog-
nized, at least some general observations seem to be called for in a
discussion of this kind. In the solution of typical conflicts problems
involving trusts, there are three sets of variables in the applicable
rules, depending upon (1) whether the res consists of movables orimmovables, (2) whether the trust is inter vivos or testamentary, and
(3) the type of problem at issue, i.e., validity, such as capacity of
parties or compliance with local property law; construction, such as
the meaning of terms like "children" or the closing of a class; and
administration, such as the trustee's powers or allocation of divi-
dends.176
In their decisions the courts are making an effort to keep the
law measurably abreast of social conditions. This effort is manifested
by a growing tendency in judicial choice of law situations involving
trusts and estates for courts to modify traditional conflicts concepts so
that undue disruption of an expressed dispositive plan may be
avoided by the selection of the most favorable law. 77 As to inter
vivos trusts of movables, and possibly as to such testamentary trusts,
the settlor or testator is permitted to specify in the deed or will the
state law which shall govern the transaction, provided it does not
175 Schaeffer v. Haseltine, 228 N.C. 484, 46 S.E.2d 463 (1948); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-
43 (1950); RESTATE ENT, PROPERTY § 343 (1940). See notes 96, 97 supra.
17 4 POWELL 534 (1954).
177 See generally Ester & Scoles, Estate Planning and Conflict of Laws, 24 Oiio ST
L.J. 270 (1963); Scoles & Rheinstein, Conflict Avoidance in Succession Planning. 21
LAw & CONTEMP. PRon. 499 (1956).
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violate settled public policy of the situs state and has some reasona-
ble connection with the transaction.17 If the instrument contains
no such express designation of a governing law and the settlor's in-
tent is not otherwise made clear, the state law applied is generally
that of the jurisdiction having closest contact or connection with the
trust. Such contacts include the place where the trust is to be ad-
ministered, the situs of the trust res, the trustee's place of business,
the domicile of the parties, and the place of execution of the trust
instrument.179 Subject to the doctrine of equitable conversion, as to
inter vivos or testamentary trusts of immovables, the settlor's intent
gets less consideration, and situs law is generally applied.8 0 The
privilege of specifying in the dispositive instrument the state law
which is to govern not only prevents conflicts problems, but it should
also avoid litigation by enabling a lawyer to draft in accordance with
a state law on which he is expert and perhaps to select a favorable
jurisdiction. Testamentary and inter vivos trusts are normally
drafted in accordance with the law of the settlor's domicile at the
time of execution; and with regard to their validity, construction,
and administration, that law should usually be the specified govern-
ing law, unless it is preferred to rely upon the court and conflicts
rules.
As to powers of appointment, conflicts problems arise when the
donor and donee are not domiciled in the same jurisdiction or when
the appointive assets have a situs in a state where neither the donor
nor the donee is domiciled. Even if all contacts are with a single
state when the power is created, this may not continue. Quite often
today, a person is domiciled in one jurisdiction when he makes his
will, in another at the time of his death, and a third state is the
situs of both movables and immovables owned by him. By tradi-
tional rules his testamentary disposal of movables is governed by the
178 Inter vivos trusts: Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 26 Del. Ch.
397, 24 A.2d 309 (1942); Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N.Y. 95, 9 N.E.2d 792 (1937);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LA'WS § 294, comment c (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
Testamentary trusts: Amerige v. Attorney Gen., 324 Mass. 648, 88 N.E.2d 126 (1949);
Matter of Tabbagh, 167 Misc. 156, 3 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Surr. Ct. 1938); Matter of Chappell,
124 Wash. 128, 213 Pac. 684 (1923); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 295
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
170 Lewis v. Hanson, 36 Del. Ch. 235, 128 A.2d 819 (1957), aft'd, 357 U.S. 235, re-
hearing denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958); National Shawmut Bank v. Cumming, 325 Mass.
457, 91 N.E.2d 337 (1950); 4 POWELL 534 (1954); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF
LAWs § 294, comment d (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
180 See Toledo Soc'y for Crippled Children v. Hickok, 152 Tex. 578, 261 S.W.2d 692
(1953); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWs §§ 241, 249 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
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law of his domicile at death""' and his immovables by the law of the
SitUS.' 8 2 Thus, it is always wise to be certain that every will or deed
meets the required formalities of all states having a present or pro-
spective contact with the transaction. In addition to the privilege of
specifying the applicable state law, some of the more important
construction problems may be avoided by cognizance of them and
the insertion of provisions to control in either the creation or exer-
cise of the power. For example, problems which are decided on the
basis of the intention of the donor or the donee may be explicitly
provided for and litigation prevented. Who are the objects of the
power is a matter of the donor's intent, and if the objects of the
power are "children" or "issue" or "heirs" of a named person, a
definitional clause settling the matter may be inserted by the drafts-
man of the power. 83 Whether a power is exercised is a matter of
the intention of the donee, and a clear intent properly manifested to
exercise or not to exercise a power will eliminate this question.
Choice of law problems which involve not questions of the intention
of the donor or of the donee but rather policy questions such as
restraints on alienation or the Rule Against Perpetuities are not so
easily handled by specific provision.8 4
Such is the state of uncertainty in the conflicts rules regarding
powers of appointment that useful generalization is difficult.',, For
the estate planner and draftsman, principal legal focuses as to powers
of appointment concern their creation and exercise. They are
usually created as part of a single conveyance, inter vivos or testa-
mentary, which often involves successive estates, legal or equitable,
and the same law usually governs the whole transaction,8 0 which, as
above stated as to movables, may be specified by the transferor-
181 Second Bank-State St. Trust Co. v. Weston, 342 Mass. 630, 174 N.E.2d 763 (1961);
In re Beaumont's Estate, 216 Pa. 350, 65 At. 799 (1907); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CON-
FLICr OF LAws § 306 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
182 McPherson v. McKay, 207 Ark. 546, 181 S.W.2d 685 (1944); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND), CoNrFLTr OF LAWS § 249 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
188 See CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 1207-08 (3d ed. 1961), suggesting the form of such
a clause.
1841d. at 669-771.
188 See generally Durand & Herterich, Conflict of Laws and the Exercise of
Powers of Appointment, 42 CoP.mNEL L.Q. 185 (1957); Ester & Scoles, supra note 177;
Scoles, Conflict of Laws in Estate Planning, 9 U. FLA. L. REV. 398 (1956).
188 Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Prindle, 290 Mass. 577, 195 N.E. 793 (1935);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 234 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959); id. § 294,
comment g; id. § 295, comment g; notes 59, 60 supra.
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donor.8 7 As to immovables, situs law controls the validity of crea-
tion of a power by deed or will.188 As to movables, the same is true
for inter vivos creation, 8 9 but the law of the donor's domicile ap-
pears to control testamentary creation. 9 0 As to exercise, situs nor-
mally governs the formal validity of an attempted inter vivos appoint-
ment of personalty,' 91 and the same is true for either a deed or a will
exercising a power of appointment over land. 92 Regarding the
validity of a testamentary appointment of personalty, it is the gen-
eral rule that if the will provision is valid under the law of either
the domicile of the donee at his death or that of the donor when he
executed the instrument creating the power, the appointment is
valid.193 The basic common law theory of relation back is of much
importance in the solution of a conflicts problem when creation and
exercise of the power occur in different jurisdictions, and the donee's
will exercising a power must generally meet the legal formalities ot
the donor's state on the theory that the property passes from the
donor to the appointee. 94
Complete and careful drafting of the dispositive instrument
which creates the power should usually specify which state law the
donor wishes to govern its validity and perhaps should empower the
donee to select the state law to govern its exercise by him. Such pro-
visions will likely prevail in the absence of real conflict with local
"
7 Lewis v. Hanson, 36 Del. Ch. 235, 128 A.2d 819 (1957), afj'd, 357 U.S. 235,
rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958); Amerige v. Attorney Gen., 324 Mass. 648, 88
N.E.2d 126 (1949); Matter of Pratt's Trust, 5 App. Div. 2d 501, 1172 N.Y.S.2d 965
(1958), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 855, 168 N.E.2d 709, 203 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1960).
188 Callwood v. Virgin Islands Natl Bank, 221 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1955); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 233, 234 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
180 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 253 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
10 LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 190 (1959); RESTATEmENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF
LAwS § 295 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959); Note, The Testator's Intention as a Factor in
Determining the Place of Probate of His Estate, 33 IND. L.J. 591 (1958).
101 Warner v. Florida Bank & Trust Co., 160 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1947); Banque de
France v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 60 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1932); O'Neil v. O'Neil, 43 Mont. 505,
117 Pac. 889 (1911); Hutchinson v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65 (1933); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 283 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
18. Liggett v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 274 Ky. 387, 118 S.W.2d 720 (1938);
Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 126 N.E. 461 (1920); Matter of Kelley, 161 Misc.
255, 291 N.Y. Supp. 860 (Surf. Ct. 1936); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAwS
§ 234 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
10"Legg's Estate v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1940); Bussing v. Hough,
237 Iowa 194, 21 N.W.2d 587 (1946); RESTATEM'ENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 287 (1934).
""L Prince de Beam v. Winans, 111 Md. 434, 74 AtI. 625 (1909); Sewall v. Wilmer,
132 Mass. 131 (1882); Bundy v. United States Trust Co., 257 Mass. 72, 153 N.E. 337
(1926); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Caldwell, 137 N.J. Eq. 362; 44 A.2d 842 (Ch. 1945);
Matter of Dean, 4 N.Y.2d 326, 151 N.E.2d 184, 175 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1958).
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policy, and frequently even in policy matters. The exercise of a
power of appointment by a nonresident donee usually involves the
laws of two states. The laws of the states differ in so many particulars
that conflicts have arisen and will arise with greater frequency as the
increased utilization of powers of appointment makes itself felt.
Recognition that the donee of the power usually has the right to direct
that the appointive property shall be administered in the donee's domi-
cile, and also the right to direct that the construction and effect of the
exercise of the power and the powers and authority of the trustee to
whom the fund is appointed shall be determined by the laws of his
domicile, would help estate planners to avoid some of the more important
conflicts.19 5
Thus, it seems possible that between them, the draftsman who
creates the power and the draftsman who exercises it can eliminate
by proper drafting a large part of the area of conflict of laws involv-
ing powers of appointment. However, in the matter of specification
of governing law, there can be no one rule because of variant fact
situations and legitimate differences of opinion by draftsmen.00
IX
A SUGGESTED PROVISION FOR POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
The following provision is calculated to settle certain of the
principal problems previously mentioned in connection with the
creation and exercise of powers of appointment. For convenience of
use it is presented in the form of a numbered set of answers to these
problems, and it may be adopted, rejected, or altered in whole or in
part. Subject to such modifications as may be in order to suit the
particular case, the entire provision or parts thereof may be included
and made applicable to one, some, or all of the powers created by the
dispositive instrument.
Unless otherwise provided, the donee of any power of appointment
created by this instrument in its exercise may appoint (1) to any one or
more of the objects of the power to the exclusion of other objects; (2) to
children or grandchildren even though the parents of such appointees
are then living; (3) limited or unlimited interests, present or future,
including life estates and remainders; (4) outright or in trust, in which
case he may select trustees who need not be objects of the power and
confer powers of appointment and such administrative powers as are
2"Durant & Herterich, supra note 185, at 207.1 08 SiaTIrruc & FARR, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK §§ 54-57 (2d ed. 1953).
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deemed appropriate upon any trustee selected; (5) subject to such condi-
tions and such lawful spendthrift and other restrictions as may be desig-
nated; (6) by creating in any object a general power of appointment or a
special power to appoint among objects of the original power; (7) pro-
vided no interest, power, or condition shall be created to benefit anyone
not an object of the power being exercised.
(8) Any power exercisable by will may be so exercised only by
specific reference to it in the donee's will. (9) Any power which is
created by will may be exercised by the donee's will, whether such will is
executed before or after the date of the donor's death.
(10) All powers created by this instrument are releasable in whole
or in part. (11) Any releasable power of appointment or administrative
power may be released in whole or in part (a) by a signed instrument in
writing, filed either with the trustee of the trust under the terms of which
such is created or with any court which has granted probate of the
donor's will, or (b) in such other manner as may be provided by law.
(12) These powers of the donee are in addition to, and not in restric-
tion of, powers he would otherwise have.
(13) Under any power of appointment created by this instrument,
no person to whom an appointment is made may share in the gift in
default of appointment unless he contributes the property appointed to
him to the fund to be distributed as in default of appointment.
(14) So far as may be allowable, all questions relating to powers of
appointment created by this instrument shall be resolved in accordance
with the law of the state of [North Carolina]. 1 6
107 See LEACH & LOGAN, FUTURE INTERESTS & ESTATE PLANNING 976 (1961); STEPHEN-
SON § 4.8; Halbach, The Use of Powers of Appointment in Estate Planning, 45 IOWA
L. REv. 691, 717 (1960).
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